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Abstract—Instruction-Level Redundancy (ILR) is a well
known approach to tolerate transient CPU faults. It replicates
instructions in a program and inserts periodic checks to detect
and correct CPU faults using majority voting, which essentially
requires three copies of each instruction and leads to high
performance overheads. As SIMD technology can operate simul-
taneously on several copies of the data, it appears to be a good
candidate for decreasing these overheads. To verify this hypoth-
esis, we propose ELZAR, a compiler framework that transforms
unmodified multithreaded applications to support triple modular
redundancy using Intel AVX extensions for vectorization. Our
experience with several benchmark suites and real-world case-
studies yields mixed results: while SIMD may be beneficial for
some workloads, e.g., CPU-intensive ones with many floating-
point operations, it exhibits higher overhead than ILR in many
applications we tested. We study the sources of overheads and
discuss possible improvements to Intel AVX that would lead to
better performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transient faults in CPUs can cause arbitrary state corruption
during computation. Therefore, they pose a significant challenge
for software systems reliability [1]. The causes for transient
faults are manifold, including radiation/particle strikes, dynamic
voltage scaling, manufacturing variability, device aging, etc.
[2]. Moreover, the general trend of ever-decreasing transistor
sizes with lower operating voltages only worsens the reliability
problem [3, 4].
The unreliability of CPUs is especially threatening at the
scale of data centers, where tens of thousands of machines are
used to support modern online services. At this sheer scale,
CPU faults happen at a surprisingly high rate and tend to
increase in frequency after the first occurrence, as reported by
a number of large-scale in-the-field studies [5, 6, 7]. Since the
machines in data centers operate in tight collaboration, a single
CPU fault can propagate to the entire data center, leading to
catastrophic consequences [8, 9].
To overcome the problem of transient CPU faults, large-
scale online services started using ad-hoc mechanisms such as
integrity checks, checksums, etc. For instance, Mesa [10], a
data warehousing system at Google, makes use of application-
specific integrity checks to detect transient faults during
computation. Unfortunately, ad-hoc mechanisms have two
major limitations: (1) they require manual effort to design and
implement application-specific integrity checks, and (2) they can
only protect from errors that are anticipated by the application
programmer.
As an alternative to ad-hoc checking techniques, one
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Fig. 1: Performance improvement with SIMD vectoriza-
tion enabled (maximum runtime speedup for Phoenix and
PARSEC benchmarks, maximum throughput increase for
Memcached, SQLite3, and Apache).
can make use of a principled approach like Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (BFT). BFT-based systems do not only tolerate
transient faults, but also malicious adversaries. Unfortunately,
BFT yields high performance and management overheads
because of its broad assumptions on the type of faults and the
power of the adversary [11, 12]. Since most online services run
behind the security perimeter of a data center, the “pessimistic”
BFT fault model is considered overkill. Therefore, BFT-based
systems are rarely adopted in practice.
To find a good compromise between ad-hoc mechanisms
and BFT-based systems, a number of light-weight hardening
techniques were proposed (see §II). These hardening techniques
transform the original program to locally detect and correct
faults. A well-known hardening approach is Instruction-Level
Redundancy (ILR) [13, 14, 15]. ILR is a compile-time trans-
formation that replicates original instructions to create separate
data flows and inserts periodic checks to detect divergence
caused by transient faults in these data flows. In particular, ILR
duplicates instructions to achieve fault detection [13, 14] and
triplicates them to tolerate faults by majority voting [16].
As a result, with ILR the CPU executes the same instruction
two or three times on several data copies. We notice that, in
fact, this corresponds to the very definition of Single Instruction
Multiple Data (SIMD) processing. SIMD exploits data level
parallelism, i.e., a single instruction operates on several pieces
of data in parallel. Given that most modern CPUs have support
for SIMD processing (Intel x86’s SSE and AVX, IBM Power’s
AltiVec, and ARM’s Neon), we can naturally ask the following
question: Can we utilize SIMD instructions to tolerate transient
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CPU faults and achieve better performance than ILR with three
copies?
Before answering this question, we first need to understand
how much of the SIMD potential of modern CPUs is actually
being used in real-world applications. To investigate this, we
tested applications from the Phoenix [17] and PARSEC [18]
benchmark suites, as well as several real-world applications,
namely Memcached, SQLite, and the Apache web server.
We compiled all applications in two versions: “native” with
all optimizations enabled, and “no-SIMD” where we disable
SSE, AVX, and all vectorization optimizations in LLVM. The
performance improvements of native over no-SIMD, shown
in Figure 1, indicate that most applications do not utilize
the benefits of SIMD processing. Indeed, most of them
exhibit less than 10% improvement, with only string match
significantly benefiting from AVX.1 One can therefore conclude
that SIMD processing units are currently largely underutilized
CPU resources and could hence be used for fault tolerance.
To this end, we propose ELZAR,2 a compiler framework
to harden unmodified multithreaded programs by leveraging
SIMD instructions available in modern CPUs (§III). ELZAR is
built on the Intel AVX technology to achieve triple modular
redundancy. Since AVX possesses 256-bit wide registers and
regular programs operate on at most 64-bit ones, it is possible
to operate with four replicas in parallel, which is more than
enough to harden applications and mask faults with majority
voting. Consequently, if a hardware fault affects one of the four
replicas in an AVX register, it can be detected and outvoted
by the other, correct replicas.
We implemented ELZAR as an extension of the LLVM
compiler framework (§IV). It executes as a pass of the usual
build process right before the final code generation. In particular,
ELZAR transforms all the regular instructions of an application
into their AVX-based counterparts, replicating data throughout
AVX registers. To achieve such transparent transformation, we
use a mix of LLVM vectors and low-level AVX intrinsics.
We evaluated our approach by applying ELZAR to the
Phoenix and PARSEC benchmark suites (§V), as well as three
real-world case-studies: Memcached, SQLite3, and Apache
(§VI). To our disappointment, our evaluation showed mostly
negative results, with an average normalized runtime slowdown
of 4.1–5.6× depending on the number of threads. When
compared against a straightforward instruction triplication
approach [16], ELZAR performed 46% worse on average. At
the same time, ELZAR was better on CPU-intensive benchmarks
with few memory accesses and many floating-point operations.
We attribute poor performance of ELZAR to two main
causes. First, there is a significant discrepancy between the
regular CPU instructions and their AVX counterparts. This
discrepancy forced us to introduce additional wrapper instruc-
tions that significantly hamper performance. Second, AVX
instructions in general have higher latencies and are less
optimized than the regular CPU instructions. Nonetheless, we
believe there is potential in using AVX for fault tolerance,
1Some applications (e.g., kmeans and swaptions) actually perform worse
when SIMD is enabled. This counter-intuitive result is explained by the fact
that compilers have only rough cycle-cost models and sometimes produce
suboptimal instruction sequences.
2Named after a four-armed character of Futurama. Similarly, Intel AVX has
4× 64-bit wide registers for SIMD processing.
and discuss how future implementations of this technology
could boost ELZAR’s performance via minor modifications to
the AVX instruction set (§VII). Our rough estimation suggests
that ELZAR could achieve overheads as low as 48% with the
changes we propose.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Our approach is based on three ideas: software-based
hardening for fault detection, triple modular redundancy for
fault recovery, and Intel AVX technology for SIMD-based fault
tolerance.
A. Software-Based Hardening
Software-based hardening techniques can be broadly di-
vided into three categories: Thread-Level Redundancy (TLR)
also called Redundant Multithreading (RMT), Process-Level
Redundancy (PLR), and Instruction-Level Redundancy (ILR).
Redundant Multithreading (RMT). In RMT approaches
[19, 20], a hardened program spawns an additional trailing
thread for each original thread. At runtime, trailing threads
are executed on separate spare cores or take advantage of the
Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) capabilities of modern
CPUs. Similar to ELZAR, RMT allows keeping only one
memory state among replicas (assuming that memory is
protected via ECC). However, RMT approaches heavily rely
on the assumption of spare cores or unused SMT, which is
commonly not the case in multithreaded environments where
programs tend to use all available CPU cores.
Process Level Redundancy (PLR). PLR implements the
similar idea as RMT, but at the level of separate processes
[21, 22]. In PLR, each process replica operates on its own
memory state, and all processes synchronize on system calls.
In multithreaded environments, allocating a separate memory
state for each process raises a challenge of non-determinism
because memory interleavings can result in discrepancies among
processes and lead to false positives. Some PLR approaches
resolve this challenge by enforcing deterministic multithreading
[23]. PLR might incur a lower performance overhead than RMT
but it still requires spare cores for efficient execution.
Instruction-Level Redundancy (ILR). In contrast to RMT
and PLR, ILR performs replication inside each thread and
does not require additional CPU cores [13, 14]. This in-thread
replication seamlessly enables multithreading and requires no
spare cores for performance. We present ILR in detail in §III-B.
Recent work on ILR mainly concentrated on optimizations
to trade-off fault coverage for lower overheads [24, 25]. In
contrast to these new approaches, ELZAR aims to utilize
SIMD technology available on modern CPUs to achieve
low performance overhead without compromising on fault
coverage. A recent proposal has shown promising initial results
when applying SIMD instructions to parallelize ILR [26]. The
scope of the work is however limited: (1) it only detects
faults and does not provide recovery; (2) it only protects
the floating-point unit; (3) it targets only single-threaded
programs; and (4) hardening is performed manually at the
level of the program’s source code. In contrast, ELZAR targets
detection and recovery of transient CPU faults for unmodified
multithreaded programs. Furthermore, ELZAR protects the
whole CPU execution including pointers, integers, and floating-
point numbers.
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HAFT is a fault tolerance technique that couples ILR
with Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) [15]. In this
work, instructions are duplicated to provide fault detection, and
an HTM mechanism roll-backs failed transactions to provide
fault recovery. ELZAR does not rely on a separate rollback
mechanism, but rather masks faults using Triple Modular
Redundancy.
Concurrent with and independent from our work, Chen
et al. [26? ] developed a similar approach that utilizes SIMD
extensions to detect CPU faults. Solution presented in their work
and ELZAR share many similarities, though ELZAR additionally
provides recovery via triple modular redundancy and supports
multithreaded applications.
B. Triple Modular Redundancy
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is a classical approach
for achieving fault tolerance in mission-critical systems [27].
TMR detects faults by simple comparison of three replicas and
performs fault recovery by majority voting, i.e., by detecting
which replica differs from the other two and correcting its state.
Consequently, it imposes an obvious restriction on the fault
model: only one replica is assumed to be affected by the fault.
While most of the software-based hardening techniques
discussed above utilize only Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR),
i.e., they can only detect but not correct faults, there are still a
number of techniques based on TMR [16, 23]. In the context
of ILR, SWIFT-R [16] extends the fault detection mechanisms
of SWIFT [14] by inserting three copies (instead of two) for
each instruction and performing periodic majority voting to
detect and correct faults. ELZAR, in contrast, implements TMR
without an increase in the number of instructions, since AVX
registers are large enough to hold at least 4 copies of the data.
C. Intel AVX
Our solution relies heavily on the Single Instruction Multiple
Data (SIMD) technology and its specific implementation,
Intel AVX. The main idea behind it is to perform the same
operation on multiple pieces of data simultaneously (data level
parallelism). Figure 2 illustrates this concept and how it relates
to replication for fault tolerance. AVX adds new wider registers
(YMM registers) that are capable of storing several elements
and the corresponding new instructions that operate on these
elements in parallel. Initially, AVX was targeted for applications
that perform parallel data processing such as image or video
processing; in this work, we (ab)use it for fault recovery. Note
that we do not use the previous generation of Intel’s SIMD
implementation, SSE, since it can only operate on two 64-bit
values and we need at least three copies to be able to correct
faults.
r1 r1 r1 r1+ r2 r2 r2 r2
r1+r2 r1+r2 r1+r2 r1+r2
Fig. 2: Addition in AVX. The original values r1 and r2
are replicated throughout the AVX registers. All four copies
are computed in parallel.
Hardware implementation. The x86-64 architecture provides
16 256-bit wide YMM registers available for AVX instructions.
Figure 3 compares them with general-purpose registers (GPRs).
... ...
RAX
RBX
RCX
R15
YMM0
YMM1
YMM2
YMM15
64 bit 256 bit
Fig. 3: General purpose (GPR) and AVX (YMM) registers.
It should be noted, however, that even though only 16 registers
are visible at the assembly level, many more registers are
implemented physically and used at runtime (e.g., 168 YMM
registers in Intel Haswell).
In modern implementations, AVX has several dedicated
execution units. It provides a high level of parallelism and
allows programs to avoid some common bottlenecks.
Instruction set. The AVX instruction set consists of a large
number of instructions, including special-purpose extensions
for cryptography, multimedia, etc. ELZAR uses only a subset
of AVX instructions, which we discuss in the following.
Most arithmetic and logic operations are covered by AVX,
except for integer division and modulo. For example, Figure 2
illustrates how addition is performed with AVX.
AVX-based comparisons act differently than their counter-
parts in the general instruction set. Instead of directly affecting
the flags in the x86 FLAGS register as normal comparisons
do, AVX comparisons return either all-1 (if result is “true”) or
all-0 (“false”) values for each YMM element. This behavior
is explained by the fact that the comparison is performed in
parallel on multiple pieces of data, with possibly conflicting
outcomes that would affect the flags differently. On the other
hand, there are no control flow instructions in the general
instruction set that could operate on such sequences of 1s
and 0s. Therefore, a ptest AVX instruction was introduced
that sets the ZF and CF flags in FLAGS by performing an
and/andn operation between its operands.3 As a result, a
branch is encoded in AVX as a sequence of an AVX comparison
followed by a ptest and a subsequent jump based on the ZF
and CF flags.
r r r r
shuffle
r r r r
431 2
12 34
Fig. 4: Shuffle instruction.
In this work, we use shuffle, a specific AVX operation
that performs data rearrangement inside a YMM register. One
example of a shuffle is shown in Figure 4. In combination with
other operations, it allows us to get much of the functionality
that is not implemented in hardware. For example, we can get
a horizontal test for equality using a combination of shuffle,
xor and ptest (see §III-C for more details).
III. DESIGN
In this section, we introduce the design of ELZAR and
describe the principle of ILR upon which it is based.
3We omit the detailed explanation of how ptest works for the sake of
simplicity. We refer the reader to the Intel architecture manuals.
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(a) Native
1 loop:
2 r1 = add r1, r2
3
4
5
6
7 cmp r1, r3
8
9
10 jne loop
(b) ILR
loop:
r1 = add r1, r2
r1’ = add r1’, r2’
r1’’ = add r1’’, r2’’
majority(r1, r1’, r1’’)
majority(r3, r3’, r3’’)
cmp r1, r3
jne loop
(c) ELZAR
loop:
y1 = add y1, y2
y4 = cmpeq y1, y3
ptest y4
ja recover(y4)
je loop
Fig. 5: Original loop (a) increments r1 by r2 until it is equal
to r3. Usual ILR transformation (b) triplicates instructions
and adds majority voting before comparison. AVX-based
ELZAR (c) replicates data inside YMM registers, inserts
ptest for comparison, and jumps to majority voting only
if a discrepancy is detected in y4.
A. System Model
Fault model. ELZAR uses the Single Event Upset (SEU) fault
model [14], where only one bit-flip in a CPU is expected to
occur during the whole execution of a program. A bit-flip
means an unexpected change in the state of a CPU register or
a wrong result of a CPU operation. The SEU is transient, i.e.,
it does not permanently damage the hardware and lasts only
for several clock cycles.
We fully protect the AVX register file and the AVX
operations; recall that they are completely decoupled from
the regular GPR registers and scalar instructions (§II-C). We
do not consider faults in the memory subsystem since it is
assumed to be protected by ECC. Our fault model also does not
cover control flow errors, assuming some orthogonal control
flow checker.
In general, ELZAR protects from more than single faults.
Indeed, four copies of data can tolerate two independent SEUs
with a high probability: If any two copies agree and each of the
other two copies disagree with the former ones, the majority
voting can still mask the faults in the latter copies (we elaborate
more on that in §III-C). In what follows, we focus on tolerating
single faults for simplicity.
Memory and synchronization model. ELZAR imposes no re-
striction on the underlying memory and synchronization model,
and even works with programs containing data races. ELZAR
does not replicate nor modify the original memory-related
operations (loads, stores, atomics) in any way, therefore the
program’s memory access behavior is unchanged. As a result,
ELZAR allows for arbitrary thread interleavings in multithreaded
programs and supports all kinds of synchronization primitives.
B. Instruction-Level Redundancy
We base ELZAR on Instruction-Level Redundancy (ILR)
[13, 14, 16], a software-based technique to detect and tolerate
transient hardware faults. As other software-based approaches,
ILR transforms the original program by replicating its com-
putation and inserting periodic checks on computation results.
An example of an ILR-transformed code snippet is shown in
Figure 5b.
Replication. ILR replicates programs at the level of instructions.
At compile-time, ILR inserts “shadow” copies for each instruc-
tion except for a few instructions classified as “synchronization”
instructions. The shadow copies operate on their own set of
shadow registers. At runtime, the program effectively executes
the original and the shadow instructions, creating mostly
independent original and shadow data flows which synchronize
only on specific instructions.
The synchronization instructions include all memory-related
operations (loads, stores, atomics) and control-flow operations
(branches, function calls, function returns). Memory-related
operations are not replicated for two reasons: (a) the memory
subsystem contains only one copy of the state and there is
no need to store twice, and (b) ILR keeps the memory access
behavior unmodified in order to allow for non-determinism
in multithreaded applications. Control-flow operations are not
replicated because ILR protects only data integrity and assumes
no control-flow faults. Note that by not replicating function
calls, ILR requires no changes in function signatures and no
wrappers for system calls and third-party non-hardened libraries.
To create a shadow data flow, ILR replicates all inputs:
values loaded from memory, values returned by function calls,
and function arguments. This is achieved by a simple move of
an input value in one of the shadow registers.
If only fault detection is required, it is sufficient to duplicate
the instructions and signal an error or simply crash if two
data flows diverge [13, 14]. If fault tolerance is needed, the
instructions must be triplicated and majority voting must be
used to mask faults in one of the three data flows (see Figure 5b)
[16].
Checks. To be able to detect faults, ILR additionally inserts
checks right before synchronization instructions. As one ex-
ample, a load address must be checked before the actual load,
otherwise a wrong value could be undetectably loaded and
used by the subsequent instructions. As another example, all
function arguments must be checked before the function call to
prevent the callee from computing with wrong values. Finally,
it is important to check the branch condition before branching
or else the program could take a wrong path.
The checks themselves are straightforward. If crash-stop
behavior is sufficient, a check compares two copies of data
and crashes the program if the copies diverge. For availability
(fault tolerance), ILR requires majority voting on three replicas
to mask a possible fault (as depicted in Figure 5b). During
majority voting, three copies of data are compared to each other,
and if one copy differs from the other two it is overwritten
with the majority value.
C. ELZAR
As appears clearly in Figure 5, ILR requires three times
more instructions than the original program plus expensive
majority voting on synchronization events. As a result, a simple
3-instruction loop may require around 13 instructions under
ILR. Such a blow-up in instructions can quickly saturate CPU
resources and result in high performance overhead.
ELZAR, on the other hand, does not replicate instructions but
rather data and thus increases the total number of instructions
only modestly. Figure 5c shows that ELZAR inserts only 2
additional instructions to perform a check on a branch condition.
The replication is achieved by utilizing wide YMM registers,
with y1–y4 each containing four copies of the original values.
The add and cmp instructions in this snippet are actually AVX
instructions which operate on four copies inside the YMM
registers in parallel. The somewhat peculiar check consists of
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the ptest AVX instruction and a subsequent jump to recovery
code if a discrepancy in branch condition y4 is detected; we
cover AVX-based checks in detail below.
In general, ELZAR transforms a program as follows: it
(1) replicates the data in YMM registers, (2) inserts periodic
checks, and (3) inserts recovery routines. In the following, we
discuss each of these steps in detail.
Step 1: Replication. AVX provides an almost complete set
of arithmetic and logical instructions: addition, subtraction,
multiplication, bitwise operations, shifts, etc. For floating point
data, all the usual instructions are present in AVX. For integers,
the only missing instructions are integer division and modulo;
ELZAR falls back to basic ILR in these cases. In general,
ELZAR achieves replication by simply replacing the original
arithmetic and logical instructions with their AVX counterparts,
as in Figure 2.
The situation is more complicated for (most) non-replicated
synchronization instructions. These are the regular loads, stores,
function calls, etc., which do not operate on YMM registers.
Thus, ELZAR has to extract one copy of each instruction’s
argument from YMM registers and use this copy in the
instruction. If a synchronization instruction returns a value
(e.g., load), this value must then be replicated inside a YMM
register. AVX provides dedicated instructions for such purposes:
extract and broadcast. Unfortunately, these additional
instructions must wrap every single load, store, etc., which
leads to high overheads. An example of such “wrapping” for a
load is shown in Figure 6.
addr addr addr addr
extract
val val val val
addr valload
broadcast
Fig. 6: Loads in ELZAR. The original load is wrapped by
AVX-based extract and broadcast.
A special case of a synchronization instruction is a branch.
A typical x86 branching sequence consists of one comparison
(cmp) which toggles the FLAGS register and the subsequent
jump instruction (je for “jump if equal”, jne for “jump if not
equal”, etc.). This is exemplified in Lines 7–10 of Figure 5a.
Unfortunately, as explained in §II-C, AVX lacks instructions
affecting control flow except for ptest. Moreover, the AVX-
based comparison instructions (e.g., cmpeq) do not toggle the
FLAGS register but instead fill the elements of a YMM register
with true/false values. Therefore, ELZAR inserts an additional
ptest to examine the result of cmpeq and only then proceeds
to a jump (see Figure 7 and also Figure 5c, Lines 7, 8, and
10).
Step 2: Adding checks. In order to detect faults, ELZAR
inserts checks before each synchronization instruction. If a
check succeeds, i.e., all copies of a YMM register contain the
same value, the program continues normally, otherwise the
YMM register must be recovered via majority voting. Note that
the check itself must be as efficient as possible since it executes
on the fast path. The recovery routine, however, resides on the
slow path and can hence be less efficient.
r1 r1 r1 r1
cmpeq
r1=r3 r1=r3 r1=r3 r1=r3
FLAGS
ptest
r3 r3 r3 r3
Fig. 7: Branching in ELZAR. The original cmp for equality
is transformed in a sequence of cmpeq and ptest.
Similar to replication, ELZAR distinguishes between
branches and all other synchronization instructions. Because
of implementation choices in AVX, checks turn out to be very
effective for branches but not for other operations. To support
efficient checks in ELZAR, we rely on the assumption that a
fault corrupts only one copy in a YMM register (see §III-A).
In general, a check on the arguments of a synchronization
instruction requires a pair-wise (horizontal) comparison of
copies inside a YMM register. For example, upon a function
call, all function arguments replicated in the corresponding
AVX registers must be checked for discrepancies. Interestingly,
AVX provides a horizontal subtraction instruction called hsub,
but it is not implemented for 64-bit integers and is generally
slow. Hence, we opted for another implementation of checks
that involves a shuffle and a subsequent xor. This idea
is illustrated in Figure 8. In an error-free case, xor produces
all-0s which is easily ruled out by ptest. In the case of a
fault in one of the copies, the result of xor is a mix of 0s and
1s, which triggers the jne path and leads to recovery.
r r r r
shuffle
r r r r
xor
r ⊕r r ⊕r r ⊕r r ⊕r 
FLAGS
ptest
jne
recover
431 2
12 3
43
4
12 1 2 4 3
Fig. 8: Check on synchronization instructions except branches
(loads, stores, etc.). ELZAR shuffles a YMM register,
xors the shuffled register with the original, checks the result
(ptest), and jumps to a recovery routine (jne) in case of
error.
A check on a branch is cheaper and conceptually simpler.
As evident in Figure 7, branching in AVX already requires an
AVX-based comparison and a ptest. We notice that in error-
free case, comparisons in ELZAR can produce only all-true
or all-false results (see §II-C). Thus, a mix of true and false
indicates a fault. Fortunately, ptest is a versatile instruction
that allows us to check for an all-true, all-false, or true-false
mix outcome simultaneously, as shown in Figure 9. Therefore,
to add a check before a branch, it is sufficient to augment the
AVX-based branching with just a single jump instruction, ja
(“jump if above”), as shown in Figure 5c, Line 9.
Step 3: Adding recovery. Checks on branches and other
synchronization instructions trigger a recovery routine when
a fault is detected. The task of this routine is to mask a fault.
5
true branch
jne je ja
false  branch recover
r1=r3 r1=r3 r1=r3 r1=r3
FLAGS
ptest
Fig. 9: AVX-based ptest toggles FLAGS such that all-true
and all-false outcomes respectively correspond to the true
and false branches, whereas a mix of true and false indicates
a fault and triggers recovery.
Because of the assumption that a fault is localized in only one
copy of the YMM register (see §III-A), it is sufficient to identify
two identical replicas in the register and blindly broadcast their
value to the whole register. This can be performed efficiently
by a single comparison of the low elements of the faulty YMM
register (depicted in gray in Figures 8 and 9) and, depending
on the result of the comparison, copying either the lowest or
the highest element to the rest of the register.
We note, however, that we can easily implement a smarter
recovery strategy that would support more complex fault
patterns involving multiple bit flips. As the recovery procedure
is on the slow path, i.e., it is triggered only rarely, it does not
need to be optimized for speed and this added reliability can
be implemented without compromising performance.
The idea of the extended recovery procedure is to check
all four elements and consider three scenarios: (1) if three
elements are identical, then the last one is faulty and can be
overwritten with the value of the former; (2) if two elements
are identical and the other two have each a different value, then
the latter elements are both faulty and can be overwritten with
the value of the former; finally, (3) if we have two groups of
two elements, with each group agreeing on a different value,
then the same fault has affected two elements and we have no
majority, hence program execution must stop. This recovery
strategy can tolerate all single bit flips, all flips of two bits
of different order in the replicas, as well as a wide variety of
more complex fault patterns that leave at least two elements
identical.
D. Data Types Support
AVX natively supports 8-, 16-, 32-, and 64-bit integers as
well as single- and double-precision floating points. However,
up to this moment the discussion implied 64-bit integers
replicated four times across a 256-bit YMM register.
There are three options to support smaller types: (1) cast
all smaller integer types to 64-bit integers and 32-bit floats
to 64-bit doubles, (2) replicate all types only four times in
the low bits of YMM registers, leaving upper bits nullified, or
(3) replicate smaller types so many times as to fill up the whole
YMM register. The first approach obviously breaks semantics
of integer overflows and floating point precision, possibly
leading to unexpected computation results. The second approach
is better but requires additional care for AVX instructions
that compute across the whole YMM register, e.g., results of
comparisons may differ in lower and upper bits. Therefore we
chose the third approach which leads to extreme settings of up
to 32-modular redundancy for 8-bit integers but is conceptually
clean.
Compilers like LLVM sometimes produce esoteric integer
types like 1-bit or 9-bit integers, usually for sign-extension and
truncation purposes. Such data types are rare but still present
in many applications, therefore we extend them to the AVX-
supported bit width and treat them as “usual” integers. We take
special care whether to zero- or sign-extend them, depending
on the associated semantics.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented ELZAR as an LLVM compiler pass [28]
that takes unmodified source code of an application and emits
an AVX-hardened executable. We also implemented a fault
injection framework to be able to test ELZAR’s fault tolerance
capabilities.
A. Compiler Framework
Tool chain. We developed ELZAR as a compiler pass in LLVM
3.7.0 (∼ 600 LOC). Additionally, we extract the implementation
of checks and recovery in a separate LLVM IR file (∼ 250
LOC). This separation allowed us to write the pass in a (mostly)
target-independent way, i.e., AVX can be substituted by another
similar technology (e.g., ARM Neon) by rewriting only the IR
file with checks and recovery.
ELZAR is plugged in the usual build process of an
application, i.e., there is no need to modify the source code or
the makefiles/configuration scripts. To achieve this, we employ
the LLVM gold linker plugin that can save the final optimized
and linked LLVM bitcode to a file. ELZAR takes this file as
input, adds AVX-based redundancy, and emits the hardened
executable. Thus, ELZAR performs its transformation after all
optimization passes and right before assembly code generation.
In order to be able to use AVX for replication, we disallow
any vectorization in original programs. All other optimizations
are enabled. Additionally, we run the scalarrepl pass to replace
all aggregate data types (structs, arrays) because they are not
natively supported by LLVM vectors we employ.
Pass details. The usual way to write AVX-enabled programs
is to use AVX intrinsics or directly AVX inline assembly. This
approach is the closest to “bare metal” and allows for fine
performance tuning, but it is also time-consuming and error-
prone. Moreover, using intrinsics or inline assembly would
make it impossible to directly port ELZAR to a different
technology than Intel AVX.
Fortunately, LLVM provides first-class vector types that
were specifically introduced for SIMD programming and come
with an extensive support for vector operations. The x86 code
generator recognizes vectors and transforms them into AVX
instructions. LLVM also introduces three special instructions to
work with vectors, extractelement, insertelement,
and shufflevector that are respectively mapped to AVX’s
extract, broadcast, and shuffle. Generally, we found
vectors to be a very powerful abstraction, with the quality of
the generated AVX code improving with each LLVM release.
With LLVM vectors, the process of AVX hardening be-
comes fairly trivial: (1) all data types of a program are
transformed into corresponding vector types, (2) each of the
synchronization instruction’s arguments is extracted from a
vector using extractelement, (3) each synchronization
instruction’s return value is broadcast to the whole vector using
insertelement, (4) all other instructions are substituted to
work on the corresponding vectors, and (5) checks and recovery
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(a) Native
1 loop:
2 r1 = add i64 r1, r2
3 c = cmp eq i64 r1, r3
4
5
6
7 br i1 c, exit, loop
(b) ELZAR
loop:
r1 = add <4 x i64> r1, r2
c1 = cmp eq <4 x i64> r1, r3
c64 = sext c1 to <4 x i64>
t = call ptest(<4 x i64> c64)
c = cmp eq i32 t, 0
br i1 c, exit, loop
Fig. 10: Example from Figure 5 as represented in simplified
LLVM IR. Original code (a) operates on i64 64-bit integers.
ELZAR (b) transforms the code to use <4 x i64> vectors
of four integers. Since LLVM-based comparisons do not
directly map to AVX, ELZAR inserts some boilerplate code
(shown in gray).
routines are inserted before synchronization instructions. An
example of ELZAR-transformed program is shown in Figure 10.
A nice feature of this vector-based approach is that one
can abstract away from the underlying AVX implementation.
As such, we do not need to care about most corner cases like
vector-based integer division which is not implemented in AVX.
We can still write it in an LLVM vector form, and the x86
code generator automatically converts it to four regular division
instructions.
The careless use of vectors, however, may seriously hamper
performance in some cases. For example, a straightforward
implementation of branches with LLVM vectors results in a
convoluted and ineffective instruction sequence; this is related to
the fact that ELZAR uses ptest in an unusual manner that was
not anticipated by the developers of the x86 code generator and
is not efficiently supported in the pattern-matching rules. For
such corner cases, we explicitly insert boilerplate code patterns
as shown in gray in Figure 10b. This code actually generates
the ptest-je instruction sequence in the final executable,
exactly as in Figure 5c.4
As discussed previously (§III-C), AVX natively supports
only 8-, 16-, 32-, and 64-bit integers and 32- and 64-bit
floating points. Since LLVM sometimes produces types with
unsupported widths, we have no other choice but to extend
them to supported types. In the case of integers, we take special
care to sign- or zero-extend them. In some other cases (e.g.,
for SQLite3), we had to switch off the long-double type using
predefined macros in the source code.
Libraries support. Most previous research in the area of ILR
focused on hardening only the program’s source code and left
third-party libraries unprotected [14, 16, 24, 25]. This leads to
better performance but also to lower fault coverage, because a
fault in library code can go undetected. We notice however that
many programs from the Phoenix and PARSEC benchmark
suites, which are used in our evaluation, heavily utilize the
standard C (libc) and math (libm) libraries. Therefore, to report
more accurate numbers, we also harden a significant part of
libc and libm. We decided not to harden the I/O, OS, and
pthreads-related functions for our prototype implementation
because their execution takes less than ∼ 5% of the overall
time. As a reference implementation, we chose the musl library
with inline assembly disabled.
4To construct the boilerplate LLVM code, we consulted the source code of
LLVM codegen’s regression tests. These tests gave us a good understanding
of how specific LLVM constructs are mapped to AVX assembly. This was
literally a “test-driven development” experience.
FI outcome Description System
Hang Program became unresponsive CrashedOS-detected OS terminated program
ELZAR-corrected ELZAR detected and corrected fault CorrectMasked Fault did not affect output
SDC Silent data corruption in output Corrupted
TABLE I: Fault injection outcomes classified.
Limitations. Our prototype does not support inline assembly
because LLVM treats assembly code as calls to undefined func-
tions and provides no information about such code. Furthermore,
our prototype does not have support for C++ exceptions.
B. Fault Injection Framework
For time budget reasons, we ran our fault injection ex-
periments on a medium-sized cluster of computers without
AVX installed. We therefore needed a fault injection tool that
can emulate Intel AVX. Since available tools do not provide
such support, we developed our own binary-level fault injector
(∼ 320 LOC) using Intel Software Development Emulator
(SDE), which provides support for AVX instructions and gdb
debugger. In the following, we give a high-level overview of
our fault injector.
Basically, a fault injection campaign for each program
proceeds in two steps. First, a program instruction trace is
collected via the Intel SDE debugtrace tool. This preparatory
step is required to automatically find and demarcate the
boundaries of the hardened part of the program (remember that
ELZAR does not harden external libraries and we do not want
to inject faults into them). Knowing these boundaries, our fault
injection tool can narrow down the set of instructions in which
the fault can be injected.
Second, the program is executed repeatedly and, in each run,
a single fault is injected (§III-A). To that end, a program-under-
test is started under Intel SDE with a gdb process attached.
To inject a fault, we dynamically create a new gdb script
that sets a random breakpoint for a given occurrence of a
particular instruction (otherwise gdb would always stop at the
first occurrence of the instruction). When the program runs
under Intel SDE with gdb attached, it stops at the breakpoint, the
fault injection happens, and the now-faulty program continues
execution. After the program terminates, our fault injection tool
examines the program output, assigns a corresponding outcome
(see below), and proceeds to another fault injection run.
Each fault injection run results in one of the outcomes listed
in Table I. To distinguish between the correct and corrupted
system states, each program-under-test is run first without
fault injections to produce a reference output (“golden run”).
Consequently, after each run, the program output is compared
against this reference output, and a SDC is signaled if two
outputs differ.
We inject faults by overwriting an output register of an
instruction where the breakpoint was set. We inject not only
in AVX (YMM) registers but also in regular (GPR) registers.
For YMM registers, we inject faults only in one element of
the register to match our fault model (§III-A).
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we answer the following questions:
• What is the performance overhead incurred by ELZAR,
and what are the causes for high overheads (§V-B)?
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• How many faults are detected and corrected by ELZAR
during fault injection experiments (§V-C)?
• How does ELZAR perform compared to a state-of-the-art
ILR implementation (§V-D)?
A. Experimental Setup
Applications. ELZAR was evaluated on two benchmark suites:
Phoenix 2.0 [17] and PARSEC 3.0 [18]. Results are reported for
all 7 Phoenix benchmarks and 7 out of 13 PARSEC benchmarks.
The remaining 6 benchmarks from the PARSEC suite were not
evaluated for the following reasons: bodytrack and raytrace
use C++ exceptions not supported by ELZAR, facesim crashes
with a runtime error when built with LLVM, freqmine is based
on OpenMP and does not compile under our version of LLVM,
canneal has inline assembly and vips has long-double floats
not supported by ELZAR.
All applications were built with LLVM 3.7.0 and ELZAR
as described in §IV-A. The native versions were built with
msse4.2 and mavx2 flags to enable SIMD vectorization.
The ELZAR versions were built with all vectorization dis-
abled, i.e., with no-sse, no-avx, fno-vectorize, and
fno-slp-vectorize flags. For all versions, all other
compiler optimizations were enabled (O3 flag). Additionally,
we used the fno-builtin flag to transparently link against
our versions of libc and libm.
Note that we compare ELZAR against the native version
with all AVX optimizations enabled. As Figure 1 indicates,
most benchmarks do not benefit from AVX. However, string
match shows a 60% increase in performance. Therefore, we
decided to also show how ELZAR performs in comparison to
the native version with AVX optimizations disabled; we refer
to this experiment as smatch-na (for “string match no AVX”).
Datasets. For the performance evaluation, we use the largest
available datasets provided by Phoenix and PARSEC. However,
for the fault injection experiments, we use the smallest available
inputs due to the extremely slow fault injection runs.
Testbed. The performance evaluation was done on a machine
with two 14-cores Intel Xeon processors operating at 2.0 GHz
(Intel Haswell microarchitecture5) with 128 GB of RAM, a
3.5 TB SATA-based SDD, and running Linux kernel 3.16.0.
Each core has private 32 KB L1 and 256 KB L2 caches, and 14
cores share a 35 MB L3 cache. For performance measurements,
we report an average of 10 runs.
For fault injections, we used a cluster of 25 machines to
parallelize the experiments. We injected a total of 2, 500 faults
in each program. All programs-under-test were run with two
threads to account for the impact of multithreading.
B. Performance Evaluation
Impact of ELZAR and scalability. The performance overheads
incurred by ELZAR are shown in Figure 11. There is significant
variability in behavior across benchmarks, with some showing
overheads as low as 10% (matrix multiplication) and some
exhibiting up to 20× worse performance (string match).
On average, the normalized runtime of ELZAR is 4.1–5.6×
depending on the number of threads.
For some benchmarks, there is also variability across the
number of threads. Ideally, if a program has linear scalability,
ELZAR should incur exactly the same performance overhead
with any number of threads, e.g., as in case of word count
or ferret. However, some benchmarks such as dedup are well-
known to have poor scalability, i.e., with many threads they
spend a lot of time on synchronization [29]. Thus, ELZAR’s
overhead is partially amortized by the sub-linear scalability of
these benchmarks.
To gain better understanding on the causes of high overheads
as well as the causes of high variability across benchmarks,
we gathered runtime statistics for native and ELZAR versions
5We also performed experiments on Intel Skylake but the results were similar
to Intel Haswell. Therefore, we omit them in our evaluation.
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of all benchmarks. The results are shown in Tables II and III.
The benchmarks were run with 16 threads (and in the case of
ELZAR, with all checks enabled) and profiled using perf-stat to
collect hardware counters of raw events such as the number of
loads, stores, branches, all instructions and AVX instructions
only, etc.
Based on the information from Tables II and III, we
can highlight several causes of high performance overheads.
Firstly, as Table III shows, ELZAR leads to an increase in
the total number of executed instructions of 4–8× on average.
This disappointingly high number is explained by the fact
that ELZAR adds wrapper instructions for loads, stores, and
branches, as well as expensive checks on synchronization
instructions (see §III-C).
Second, looking at the achieved Instruction-Level Paral-
lelism (ILP) in Table III, we notice that current x86 CPUs
provide much better parallelization for regular instructions
as compared to AVX instructions. As one example, linear
regression achieves a high ILP of 6.51 instructions/cycle in
native execution, but the AVX-based version reaches only a
disappointing ILP of 1.7. Combined with the 10.49× increase
in number of instructions for the AVX-based version, it is no
surprise that linear regression exhibits an overhead of ∼ 5–8×.
Two benchmarks that show the lowest overheads are
matrix multiplication and blackscholes. In the case of matrix
multiplication, almost all of ELZAR’s overhead is amortized by
a very poor memory access pattern that leads to 62.39% of all
memory references missing L1 cache; in other words, matrix
multiplication spends more time in waiting for memory than
in actual computation. In the case of blackscholes, the main
cause for low overheads is the small fraction of loads/stores
(12.22%) and branches (15.63%).
Finally, we inspected the causes for extremely high over-
heads in string match. First of all, string match by itself
significantly benefits from AVX vectorization (see Figure 1).
Indeed, ELZAR is ∼ 15–20× slower than the native version,
but ∼ 10–14× slower than native with AVX vectorization
disabled. Second of all, ELZAR increases the total number of
executed instructions by a factor of 32. Upon examining the
source code of string match, we noticed that it spends most of
the time in bzero to nullify some chunks of memory. LLVM
produces a very effective assembly for this helper routine, but
ELZAR inserts wrappers and checks for the store and branch
instructions in bzero, leading to much longer and slower
assembly code.
Impact of checks. We also investigated the impact of checks
inserted by ELZAR (see §III-C). Figure 12 shows the results
of successively disabling checks on loads, stores, branches,
and all other instructions (e.g., function calls, function returns,
atomics). Note that the results are shown for benchmarks run
with 16 threads.
We observe that checks constitute a significant part of the
overall performance overhead of ELZAR. For example, disabling
checks on loads and stores decreases the overhead from 4.2
to 2.7× on average, a difference of 55%. Disabling checks
on branches leads to a negligible overhead reduction of 4%,
which proves that our branch checking scheme is very efficient
(§III-C).
We also observe that disabling checks on loads and stores
respectively reduces the overhead by 11% and 40%, i.e., checks
Bench L1-miss br-miss loads stores branches
hist 0.66 0.01 53.21 26.67 9.56
km 1.48 0.33 20.83 0.48 14.96
linreg 2.05 0.01 18.02 0.21 3.82
mmul 62.39 0.14 40.16 0.07 10.10
pca 12.19 0.27 14.21 0.21 3.79
smatch 0.12 0.70 11.61 14.35 22.40
wc 10.94 3.31 29.75 23.63 13.67
black 0.40 1.21 9.38 2.84 15.63
dedup 4.30 3.80 30.08 13.55 12.01
ferret 4.69 12.65 14.47 2.28 17.42
fluid 1.17 14.70 11.77 2.58 14.29
scluster 4.17 1.47 32.60 0.43 9.33
swap 0.82 0.97 30.98 4.80 11.05
x264 0.34 0.31 26.83 8.32 21.00
TABLE II: Runtime statistics for native versions of bench-
marks with 16 threads: L1D-cache and branch miss ratios,
and fraction of loads, stores, and branches over executed
instructions (all numbers in percent).
Instruction-Level Parallelism Increase in # of instr
(ILP), instr/cycle w.r.t. native
Bench Native ELZAR SWIFT-R ELZAR SWIFT-R
hist 1.59 2.13 4.30 8.56 6.17
km 3.48 2.58 3.85 6.37 4.34
linreg 6.51 1.70 3.46 10.49 4.33
mmul 0.22 0.96 1.71 4.47 7.77
pca 2.61 2.28 3.89 6.82 9.45
smatch 2.38 3.26 3.46 32.72 11.56
wc 1.31 2.24 3.05 6.14 3.42
black 1.83 1.77 2.97 1.70 5.18
dedup 1.04 1.75 2.00 4.64 3.68
ferret 1.11 1.81 2.57 4.32 6.33
fluid 1.22 1.54 2.77 2.43 6.02
scluster 0.68 1.22 1.34 3.77 3.87
swap 1.97 2.06 2.68 3.50 4.40
x264 2.11 2.00 3.44 3.26 3.71
TABLE III: Runtime statistics for ELZAR and SWIFT-R
versions of benchmarks with 16 threads: Instruction-Level
Parallelism (ILP) and increase factor in the number of
executed instructions w.r.t. native.
on stores have higher overheads than checks on loads. The
reason is that stores require to check both the address and the
value to store whereas loads only need to check the address.
Floating point-only protection. As AVX was initially devel-
oped to accelerate floating-point calculations, it is interesting
to study the overheads when applying ELZAR only to floating-
point data. We thus developed a stripped-down version of
ELZAR that replicates floats and doubles but not integers and
pointers, and ran tests on several PARSEC benchmarks that
contain sufficiently many floating-point operations: blackscholes
(47% of all instructions are floating-point), fluidanimate (32%),
and swaptions (34%) [18].
Our results prove that ELZAR hardens floating points with a
low overhead. Depending on the number of threads, we observe
a 9–35% performance overhead over native for blackscholes,6
10–18% for fluidanimate, and 40–60% for swaptions. The
overhead is mainly caused by the checks on synchronization
instructions.
C. Fault Injection Experiments
The results of the fault injection experiments are shown
in Figure 13. On average, ELZAR reduces the SDC rate from
27% to 5% and the crash rate from 18% to 6%.
Histogram has the worst result with 12% SDC. It highlights
6This is in line with the numbers reported by Chen et al. [26] where a
single-threaded, manually written SSE-based version of blackscholes exhibits
∼ 30% overhead.
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Fig. 14: Performance comparison of ELZAR and SWIFT-R
(with 16 threads).
ELZAR’s window of vulnerability: address extractions before
loads and stores. If a fault occurs in the extracted address, it
will be used to load a value from the wrong address, and this
value will then be broadcast to all replicas. In other words, the
fault will remain undetected and may lead to SDC (similarly,
such a fault may lead to a segmentation fault and therefore to a
system crash). Indeed, Table II tends to confirm this observation
since histogram has the highest number of memory accesses
among all benchmarks. Similarly, blackscholes has the least
number of loads/stores and thus has only 1% SDC.
D. Comparison with Instruction Triplication
Lastly, we compare ELZAR against a common ILR approach
based on triplication of instructions. More specifically, we
compare ELZAR against SWIFT-R [16] as shown in Figure 14.
We re-implemented SWIFT-R because its source code was not
publicly available; we employed manual assembly inspection
to make sure our implementation of SWIFT-R produces fast
and correct code.
In general, SWIFT-R incurs lower overheads than ELZAR,
2.5× against 3.7× on average. Interestingly, ELZAR performs
better in three benchmarks, namely kmeans, blackscholes, and
fluidanimate. To understand the differences between these
approaches, we also report runtime statistics of SWIFT-R
(Table III).
We can draw two conclusions. First, SWIFT-R benefits
from higher ILP, which is the key for its low performance
overhead. As discussed before, ELZAR takes a different stance
and replicates not instructions but data; that is why it exhibits
lower ILP but still performs on par with SWIFT-R in many
cases.
Second, SWIFT-R significantly increases the number of
instructions, which hampers its performance. ELZAR has a
smaller increase, proving our hypothesis that AVX-based ILR
leads to less code blow-up. For example, ELZAR outperforms
SWIFT-R on blackscholes and fluidanimate exactly for this
reason: even though SWIFT-R’s ILP is almost 2× higher than
ELZAR, SWIFT-R produces ∼ 2.5–3× more instructions.
At the same time, SWIFT-R significantly outperforms
ELZAR in benchmarks that are dominated by memory accesses.
In these cases, ELZAR inserts a plethora of checks and wrappers,
which results in a much higher number of instructions compared
to SWIFT-R. This is exemplified by histogram, string match,
and word count.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we report our experience on applying ELZAR
to three real-world applications: Memcached, SQLite3, and
Apache.
Memcached key-value store. We evaluated Memcached
v1.4.24 with all optimizations enabled, including atomic
memory accesses. The evaluation was performed locally on
the same Haswell machine used for other experiments, with
1–16 cores dedicated to the Memcached server and all other
cores to the YCSB clients [30] for generating workload. We
opted to show the local performance of Memcached because
the performance in a distributed environment is limited by the
network and not by the CPU.
Figure 15a shows the throughput of native and ELZAR
versions of Memcached run with two extreme YCSB workloads:
A (50% reads, 50% writes, Zipf distribution) and D (95% reads,
5% writes, latest distribution). We observe that ELZAR scales
on par with native, achieving up to 72% of native throughput
for workload A and up to 85% for workload D. We also
observed in our experiments that the latency of ELZAR is
∼ 25% worse than native (not shown here). Such good results
are explained partially by Memcached’s poor memory locality,
which amortizes the costs of ELZAR.
SQLite database. We evaluated SQLite3 using an in-memory
database and YCSB workloads, similar to Memcached. We
should note that SQLite3 has a reverse scalability curve because
it was designed to be thread-safe and not concurrent. Therefore,
SQLite3 exhibits worse throughput with higher numbers of
threads.
The performance results are shown in Figure 15b. ELZAR
performs poorly, achieving only 20–30% of the throughput of
the native version. This overhead comes from the high number
of locally near loads and stores, as well as function calls and
function pointers. In all these cases, ELZAR inserts additional
checks and wrappers that significantly degrade performance.
Apache web server. We evaluated the Apache web server using
its “worker multi-processing module” with a single running
process and a varying number of worker threads. As a client,
we used the classical ab benchmark which repeatedly requests
a static 1MB web page.
Figure 15c shows the throughput with varying number of
threads. ELZAR performs very well, with an average throughput
of 85% compared to native. We attribute this good performance
to the fact that Apache extensively uses third-party libraries
that are not hardened by ELZAR.
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workload D (95% reads, 5% writes, latest distribution).
Loads Stores Branches
average-case 1.96 1.00 1.86
worst-case 2.06 1.14 1.89
TABLE IV: Normalized runtime of AVX-based versions of
microbenchmarks w.r.t. native versions.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we highlight performance bottlenecks in the
current AVX implementation and discuss the possible remedies.
A. Performance Bottlenecks
Loads, stores, and branches. Even not taking into account
the overhead of checks, ELZAR still performs 160% worse than
the native version (see Figure 12, “all checks disabled”). This
performance impact stems mainly from the three bottlenecks:
loads, stores, and branches.
To understand the impact of each of the three main
bottlenecks, we created a set of microbenchmarks. Each
microbenchmark has two versions: one with the regular
instruction (e.g., regular load) and one with the AVX-based
instruction (e.g., AVX-based load as shown in Figure 6). In
each microbenchmark, the instruction is replicated several times
to saturate the CPU and wrapped in a loop to get execution
time of at least 1 second. We wrote the microbenchmarks using
volatile inline assembly to be sure that our instructions are not
optimized away by the compiler; all tests were performed on
our Intel Haswell machine.
The results of microbenchmarks are shown in Table IV. We
conclude that adding extract-broadcast wrappers for
AVX-based loads results in a ∼ 2× increase of load execution
time. Similarly, adding ptest for AVX-based branches leads
to an overhead of ∼ 1.9×. Interestingly, AVX-based stores do
not exhibit high overhead, which is explained by the fact that
our Intel Haswell has only one port to process data stores and
thus the store operation itself is a bottleneck even in the native
version.
Checks on loads and stores. As can be seen from Figure 12,
ELZAR’s checks on synchronization instructions contribute
a significant amount of the overhead (39% on average).
Specifically, checks on loads and stores account for most of
the overhead because of the complicated sequence of check
instructions (see Figure 8). At the same time, checks on
branches add only 5% overhead due to an efficient re-use
of ptest already needed for branching itself (see Figure 9).
Missing instructions. Our Intel Haswell supports the AVX2
instruction set. Though AVX2 provides instructions for almost
all operations, some classes of operations are missing. Two
prominent examples are integer division and integer truncation.
In the case of integer divisions, ELZAR generates at least four
regular division instructions and the corresponding wrappers
to extract elements from the input YMM registers and insert
elements in the output YMM register; with truncations, the
situation is similar. Clearly, emulating such missing instructions
via a long sequence of available AVX instructions can lead to
tremendous slowdowns.7 For example, our microbenchmark
for truncation exhibits overheads of 8×.
B. Proposed AVX Instructions
ELZAR could greatly benefit from a rather restricted set of
new AVX instructions as proposed next. The instructions we
propose are not ELZAR-specific and other applications can find
use for them. Moreover, some of them are already introduced in
the AVX-512 instruction set which will be available in Intel’s
upcoming CPUs.
Loads and stores (gathers and scatters). As is clear from
Figure 6, regular load instructions are restricted in that they
require an address operand specified in a general-purpose
register (GPR). ELZAR would need an instruction that can
load the elements of an output YMM register from several
addresses specified in the corresponding elements of an input
YMM register.
The current implementations of AVX already support a
similar instruction called gather (Figure 16, left). Unfortu-
nately, gather instructions still require a base address from
a GPR and do not yet support all data types. Moreover, the
current implementation is slower than a simple sequence of
several loads [31]. Nonetheless, we can expect that future AVX
implementations will provide better support for gathers so that
they can be successfully exploited in ELZAR. Interestingly,
introducing gathers could also close a window of vulnerability
discussed in §V-C.
A similar argument can be made regarding stores. AVX-
512 introduces scatter instructions that can store elements
7One simple optimization would be to identify missing instructions and emit
a sequence of only 3 divisions/truncations. However, this solution still requires
extracting elements and then combining them again. For our prototype, we
had no need to implement such an optimization because these instructions are
rare.
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Fig. 16: Offloading checks to a FPGA accelerator via
gather/scatter AVX instructions.
from a YMM register based on the addresses in another YMM
register. Thus, ELZAR could advantageously substitute current
implementations of stores with scatters.
Comparisons affecting FLAGS. Currently, AVX exposes only
one instruction, ptest, that can affect control flow by toggling
the FLAGS register. Accordingly, ELZAR inserts an AVX-based
comparison followed by a ptest to implement branching, as
shown in Figure 7. Table IV indicates that this additional
operation leads to an overhead of almost 2×.
The only way to improve performance of branches is to
re-implement the logic of the usual comparison instructions.
In x86, a cmp instruction performs both the comparison and
the toggling of FLAGS. We would propose a similar family
of AVX-based comparisons which could output the result
of comparison (§II-C) and set the corresponding flags in
FLAGS. Such improved comparisons could be also beneficial
for vectorized applications that rely heavily on ptest.
Checks on loads and stores. Checks on loads and stores
are implemented via an inefficient shuffle-xor-ptest
sequence (see Figure 8). Having a single comparison instruction
similar to the comparisons described above would greatly
decrease the overheads of checks. Such an instruction would
perform a pair-wise comparison of neighboring elements in a
YMM register (so-called “horizontal” comparison) and toggle
FLAGS. Thus, a long sequence of instructions from Figure 8
would be replaced by a single instruction.
The benefits of such an instruction for other applications
than ELZAR are unclear. Thus, in the next section we propose
a more viable alternative involving an FPGA accelerator.
Truncations, divisions, and others. Curiously, a family of
truncation operations (vpmov, vcvt) is already implemented
in AVX-512. Integer division and modulo operations are
quite rare and their absence is unlikely to lead to significant
overheads; thus we believe these instructions are no candidates
for future AVX implementations. We probably missed some
other instructions that are not present in AVX, but we believe
they are sufficiently uncommon to not provide much benefit
for ELZAR.
C. Offloading Checks
In order to decrease the overhead of checks, we can take
advantage of the upcoming FPGA accelerators that will become
part of CPUs [32]. These FPGAs will be tightly coupled with
the CPU and both will share the virtual memory of a process.
As such, it will likely be possible to offload some functionality
from the CPU to the FPGA.8
We propose to offload the checks on loads and stores to
the FPGA as follows (see Figure 16). For an ELZAR-hardened
8As of December 2015, details on the Intel FPGA accelerators are not public
and our speculations may prove wrong when the final products are released.
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Fig. 17: Estimation of performance overhead of ELZAR with
the proposed changes to AVX (with 16 threads).
program, all loads and stores are tunneled through the FPGA.
The FPGA checks all copies of the address (for loads) and all
copies of the value (for stores) and implements majority voting
to mask possible faults. After that, the FPGA performs a load
from a correct address or a store of a correct value. For loads,
the FPGA also replicates the loaded value and sends it back
to the CPU.
D. Expected Overheads
To summarize, our proposed set of changes in the underlying
hardware is as follows: (1) using AVX-based gathers/scatters for
loads/stores, (2) using AVX-based comparisons that can directly
toggle FLAGS, and (3) offloading checks on loads/stores onto
an FPGA.
To understand the synergistic effect of the proposed changes,
we performed the following experiment. First, we note that it is
not possible to substitute AVX-based loads, stores, and branches
with cheaper alternatives without disrupting the original flow
of our benchmarks. Thus, we do a “reverse” comparison, i.e.,
instead of accelerating ELZAR, we decelerate the native versions
by adding dummy inline assembly around loads, stores, and
branches. The assembly we add consists of instructions that
ELZAR uses as wrappers (see §III-C), e.g., we add dummy
extract and broadcast for each load and a dummy
ptest for each branch.9 Consequently, the overhead of ELZAR
with regard to this impaired native version serves as a rough
estimate of ELZAR overheads with our proposed changes.
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 17. The
average performance overhead is estimated to be 48%, i.e., an
improvement of 150% over current ELZAR. Many benchmarks
exhibit very low overhead of 10–20%. The case of string match
is peculiar, since it turns out to be faster than the native version
in our experiment. Upon reading the disassembly, we found
out that our dummy inline assembly in the “decelerated” native
version prevented an optimization of function inlining: this
led to a faster execution time of the ELZAR version than the
“decelerated” version.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented ELZAR, an AVX-based implementation of
Instruction-Level Replication (ILR). ELZAR achieves fault
tolerance not by replicating instructions, but by replicating
data inside AVX registers. To our disappointment, we found
out that AVX suffers from several limitations that lead to poor
performance when used for ILR. The observed performance
9Adding dummy assembly can affect code generation and the CPU pipeline,
but on average produces an adequately accurate estimation.
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bottlenecks are primarily caused by the lack of suitable control
flow and memory access instructions in the AVX instruction set,
which necessitates the introduction of wrappers and ineffective
checks for some types of instructions. We believe that these
limitations can be overcome by simple extensions to the AVX
instruction set. We proposed improvements for the future
generations of AVX that can lower the overheads of ELZAR
down to ∼ 48% according to our study.
The shortened version of this report was published as a
Practical Experience Report in the 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
(DSN’2016) [33].
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